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WILLIAM H. DUTTON 
Abstract: The major narrative of the Internet over the last 
decade has been focused on technical advances and the 
public and commercial opportunities they present. Over the 
next decade, the narrative will shift to policy and regulation. 
This essay provides a brief outline of the likely shift, the 
factors driving it, and the implications it will have both for 
the future of the Internet and for Internet research.  
INTRODUCTION 
 Contemporary policymakers confront a wide array of key 
substantive policy issues, from net neutrality in the United States to 
global Internet governance internationally. This essay, however, steps 
back from focusing on particular policy issues to discuss the larger 
context and major challenges facing research on media, information, 
and Internet policy and governance. Most generally, my questions 
revolve around the future of research on the Internet, which will need 
to focus far more than it has in the past decade on media, information 
and Internet policy and regulation issues, and how centers and faculty 
can best advance the role of research in this area. The key challenge is 
how to put policy research in its rightful place. I am not suggesting 
that it should be put “back” in place, as I am not entirely certain that 
policy research has ever been where it deserves to be in the fields of 
media, information, and communication studies. 
* This paper is based on a talk given at the conference on the Future of Internet Regulation
at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law on March 27, 2015. The author thanks 
Peter Shane for his review and constructive comments on this paper. 
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 For example, since the first years of the twenty-first century, there 
have been countless timelines describing histories of the Internet.1 
Whether you begin from Computer Inquiry II or from the dotcom 
bubble of 2000, histories of the Internet have been primarily about 
technological innovations—such as TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol), the web, search, video, social media, and 
the Internet of Things (IoT)—and about the companies and services 
that have grown around them and transformed what we know as the 
Internet. If you look at any timeline of the Internet’s development, you 
will see a series of technical milestones. They track the astonishing 
pace of technical innovations that have reconfigured how people 
access information, people, services, and technology itself in ways that 
change the outcomes of those activities, as well as the way we do 
things.2  
 During the first decade of the century, however, few timelines have 
featured major initiatives in policy and regulation around the Internet 
and related media and information technologies, beyond general 
support for not regulating the Internet in many nations. Law and 
policy in a number of nations, such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States, basically defined the Internet as outside of the standard 
areas of regulation for the post, broadcasting, telecommunications, 
and mobile communications. Additionally, in line with this boundary, 
telecommunications policy research focused on post, 
telecommunications, cable, and broadcasting, and also on the issues 
surrounding their use, such as universal service and competition.3 
 A valuable body of policy literature did emerge around the 
Internet and digital media, but focused on five broad themes (Table 
1).4 First, a number of studies dealt with initiatives aimed at ensuring 
access to the Internet, including work on digital divides. A second 
tended to describe and critically assess initiatives aimed at controlling 
Internet content, such as in the areas of content filtering and 
copyright. A third set of studies emerged around social and political 
 
 
 
 
1 Thomas Haigh et al., Histories of the Internet: Introducing a Special Issue of 
Information & Culture, 50 INFORMATION & CULTURE 143 (2015). 
2 WILLIAM H. DUTTON, SOCIETY ON THE LINE (1999). 
3 Phillip Napoli’s popular communication policy text illustrates this focus at the turn of the 
century. See PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATION POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND 
PROCESS IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 11-28 (2001). 
5 See ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 
(Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010). 
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movements to block regulatory initiatives, such as blocking passage of 
the U.S. Stop Online Privacy Act. Another more emergent set of 
studies focused on developing the case for Internet regulations, such 
as in the area of child protection, protecting network neutrality,5 and 
defining privacy online, such as developing the case of a right to be 
forgotten.6 Finally, there has been a continuing stream of work on 
broad issues of Internet governance seeking to define mechanisms for 
governing the Internet across the globe.7  
Table 1. Themes of Early Internet Policy Research 
Themes Illustrative Issues 
Access Digital Divides, Inequalities Skills, Universal Access to 
Broadband 
Controlling 
Content 
Copyright, Internet Filtering 
Politics of the Net Movements to block regulations, such as SOPA in the 
U.S., C30 in Canada 
Internet 
Regulation 
Child Protection, Network Neutrality, Online Privacy, 
Right to be Forgotten 
Internet 
Governance 
Institutions and processes for global and local 
governance 
 By 2013, the landscape had already begun to change. Edward 
Snowden’s revelations joined growing concerns over big data, social 
media, and the Internet of Things (IoT) to dramatically raise the 
specter of developing more regulation around the Internet and related 
media. Certainly, by 2015, there was a rise of regulatory and policy 
initiatives focused on the Internet across numerous nations. This is 
most evident in some of the key policy developments in the United 
States, where ensuring non-regulation of the Internet was, perhaps, 
most pronounced until 2015.  
5 Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMMUNICATIONS & 
HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
6 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
(2009); William H. Dutton, Programming to Forget. A Review of Delete: The Virtue of 
Forgetting in the Digital Age by Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, 327 SCIENCE 1456 (2010). 
7 See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE 
TAMING OF CYBERSPACE (2002); MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORK AND STATES: THE GLOBAL 
POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2010); LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014). 
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 In early 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
issued landmark decisions on network neutrality and more, including 
municipal broadband. Streaming “over the top” video services were a 
burgeoning development at this time, and the FCC initiated a 
proceeding in late 2014 exploring how to regulate these services.8  
 The FCC, however, was only one of a number of players beginning 
to focus more on Internet policy and regulation. For example, 
President Barack Obama pushed for strong network neutrality 
regulation before the FCC took initiative in this area.9 Likewise, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) became involved in a tussle of sorts 
with the FCC over who was responsible for network neutrality because 
the FTC focuses on antitrust, which network neutrality seeks to 
support.10 The FTC also saw itself responsible for privacy online, and 
it, therefore, became involved in another tussle with the FCC over who 
should lead in this area.11 The Obama Administration began 
discussion of legislation, initially entitled the Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights Act, to give users more control over personal data.12 The New 
York Times criticized it as a “weak” privacy proposal, wanting to see 
even stronger legislation. This was so, even though other legislation 
also sought to limit how companies could use personal data, including 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Video Privacy Protection Act.13  
 These are just some of the agencies entering the Internet 
regulation arena. For example, even the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) started limiting mobile medical applications 
that provide information to patients, potentially crossing a First 
9 Promoting Innovation and Competition in the Provision of Multichannel Video 
Programming Distribution Services, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, available 
at https://www.fcc.gov/document/commission-adopts-mvpd-definition-nprm. 
:  Barack Obama, President Obama Urges FCC to Implement Stronger Net Neutrality 
Rules, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 10, 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/10/president-obama-urges-fcc-implement-
stronger-net-neutrality-rules. 
21 Kathryn Bachman, FCC vs. FTC—a New Privacy Turf War, BENTON FOUNDATION BLOG 
(Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.benton.org/headlines/fcc-vs-ftc-new-privacy-turf-war. 
22 Id. 
12 Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, THE 
WHITE HOUSE, available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-
discussion-draft.pdf. 
13 Editorial, The President’s Weak Privacy Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, at A28. 
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Amendment line.14 It was not just the regulatory agencies and inter-
agency politics in this arena, but, as illustrated by President Obama’s 
efforts on behalf of privacy and network neutrality, politicians were 
also moving into this area in the United States and abroad, such as 
with Congress seriously discussing network neutrality legislation.15 
 Whatever the merits of any of these policy initiatives, together 
they signal a shift towards a more proactive role of a national 
government, guiding the Internet and related Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) from social media to the IoT. Of 
course, the United States is not alone. In the area of net neutrality, the 
Netherlands has adopted regulations of its own, and, more generally, 
many other nations are establishing national policy initiatives to 
govern the Internet and related ICTs.16  
 Moreover, this is not simply a movement at the national level. 
There is a regional and global focus on the Internet by policymakers 
around the world. Regionally, the European Union provides a leading 
example with the Commission’s work on network neutrality, 
promoting a European-style, two-speed Internet that takes almost a 
completely different approach to network neutrality than the U.S. with 
its opposition to “fast lanes.”17 Globally, national regulatory initiatives, 
such as in Asia and the Global South, are being accompanied by 
growing support for a greater role of states in global Internet 
governance,18 such as in promoting multi-lateral approaches, rather 
than more multi-stakeholder approaches to governance that had 
found favor in such arenas as the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 
and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
25 Adam Candeub, Digital Medicine, the FDA, and the First Amendment (Mich. St. U. Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 12-08). 
15 For example, Congresswoman Blackburn introduced a bill in the 114th Congress, 1st 
Session, “to prohibit the Federal Communications Commission from reclassifying 
broadband Internet access service as a telecommunications service and from imposing 
certain regulations on providers of such service.” See H.R. 1212, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1212/text. 
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: The open internet and 
net neutrality in Europe, COM (2011) 0222 final (Apr. 19, 2011). 
17 Daniel Thomas et al., Proposals on European Net Neutrality Open ‘Two-Speed’ Internet, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 3, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5688747c-c192-11e4-
bd24-00144feab7de.html#axzz3VJRCnITW.  
18 MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES, supra note 7. 
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(ICANN). These moves toward multi-lateral governance approaches 
aim to put states in a more central role in global Internet governance 
processes, such as by supporting a greater role of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU)—reflecting the states’ push for more 
national policy and regulation of the Internet.19  
 At the most general level, governments and their regional and 
global organizations are trying very hard to better control the Internet 
in its broadest sense. To borrow former President Bill Clinton’s 
metaphor, if governments are not trying to “nail J-ELLO to the wall,”31 
it appears that they are seeking more and more to put the J-ELLO in 
some more well-defined molds, often those that were used for older 
media.  
 Of course, some argue that governmental policy and regulation is 
increasingly irrelevant or marginal to the future of the Internet, as it is 
technological innovation driving its global diffusion and widespread 
application. Others argue that government policy has always been a 
factor shaping the Internet. As my colleague Steve Wildman put it 
over a cup of tea, policy in communications is analogous to gravity in 
the physical world: it provides the context for day-to-day practice, 
business plans, and designs.  
 For example, the First Amendment is policy, albeit one that has 
helped enable the Internet to be what Ithiel de Sola Pool might have 
called a “technology of freedom.”21 Likewise, the FCC’s Computer 
Inquiry II and many subsequent decisions have created the context in 
which the Internet, as we know it, has developed and flourished in the 
United States and around the world.  
 Also, since Computer Inquiry II, public policy and regulation 
essentially sought to foster the growth of enhanced services that might 
employ common carrier transmission facilities to provide computer-
based applications. This seemed to be an attempt not only to resolve 
definitional issues over telecommunications versus computer services, 
which remains an issue today, but also to foster innovation in 
enhanced services, as part of what I would call a “technology-led 
19 William H. Dutton, Multistakeholder Governance? (Mich. St. U. Quello Ctr., Working 
Paper 2015).  
20 Bill Clinton, Address at The Johns Hopkins University (Mar. 8, 2000), available at 
http://www.techlawjournal.com/trade/20000309.htm. 
21 See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). 
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industrial policy.”22 This policy has been one of the most remarkable 
communication policy achievements of our time.  
 Yet, recent moves are more clearly introducing additional controls 
and restrictions on the providers and users of the Internet and 
associated telecommunication services. The days of arguing that the 
Internet cannot be controlled, restricted, or regulated seem to be 
fading into a distant memory, even if their proponents view them as 
efforts to protect the Internet as we know it.  
I.  THE SHIFT FROM TECHNOLOGY TO POLICY  
 Put in the most general and dramatic terms: I believe the narrative 
of the last decade of the Internet, if not the last several decades, has 
mainly been about technical innovation. Over the next decade, it will 
be about policy and regulation. Some have referred to initiatives like 
network neutrality as a sign of “regulatory creep,” but it might even be 
a regulatory surge that is underway.23 
 This shift from technological innovation to policy and regulation 
began to emerge over the first decade of the century, but became more 
clearly evident starting in 2014. Since 2010, I have been arguing that 
the narrative describing the coming decades will be mainly about 
policy and governance, and much less about technical innovation. I 
not only believe this shift is happening, but that it is one of the most 
significant developments that will shape the future of the Internet in 
the coming years, and also the future of the field of policy research in 
media, information, and Internet studies.  
 All of this begs several questions, which I will address through the 
remainder of this article. Why? What are the risks and opportunities? 
What should policy researchers do about it? What can be done? 
A. WHY? 
 There are four major reasons why politicians and regulators are 
moving more decisively into this space in order to control the 
Internet: the significance of the Internet, the decline of older media 
22 Herbert Kubichek & William H. Dutton, The Social Shaping of Information 
Superhighways: An Introduction, in THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF INFORMATION 
SUPERHIGHWAYS: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ROADS TO THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 9-44 
(Herbert Kubicek et al. eds., 1997). 
23 BOB ZELNICK & EVA ZELNICK, THE ILLUSION OF NET NEUTRALITY: POLITICAL ALARMISM, 
REGULATORY CREEP AND THE REAL THREAT TO INTERNET FREEDOM (2013). 
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and information technologies, moral panics over new media, and 
growing trust in regulatory responses. 
1. Significance of the Internet 
 The most important, but maybe the most seemingly banal or 
obvious, reason is the sheer significance of the Internet to every 
country and every person on the planet. You may take this observation 
for granted, but it is only recently that the Internet has been viewed as 
increasingly important and even essential. It is amazing how quick the 
public forgets the marginal status of the Internet and related new 
media over the decades.  
 I recall joining the Annenberg School for Communication at the 
University of Southern California, which had a focus on new media as 
early as 1974. Even when I joined the School in 1980, a focus on new 
media was viewed widely across the communications field as a folly. 
Luckily for me, it was prescient, not foolish. Later, in 2002, when I 
became the founding Director of the Oxford Internet Institute (OII), I 
remember colleagues asking me: What will you do in a few years, after 
the Internet collapses in the wake of the dotcom crash? I might as well 
have been director of the CB Radio Institute. Of course, they were 
wrong. The Internet has become ever more important as everyone and 
everything is increasingly networked and, by all appearances, they will 
continue to be.  
 Anecdotes aside, at the OII, I helped launch and sustain the 
Oxford Internet Surveys (OxIS), which enabled me to follow the use of 
the Internet from 2003 through 2013 through what remains the 
widest ranging and highest quality national data available about who 
uses and does not use the Internet and with what consequences.  
 We asked users and non-users about the significance of the 
Internet. Even in 2003, only a very small proportion of Internet users 
thought the Internet was very significant, much less essential.24 In 
every survey since 2003, a growing proportion of Internet users in 
Britain began to believe that the Internet was not just very significant, 
but actually essential to their information needs and to their 
entertainment.25 In 2013, for example, among what I have called “next 
24 William H. Dutton et al., The Internet in Britain, OXFORD INTERNET SURVEY 2005 
REPORT, available at www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/oxis/oxis2005_report.pdf. 
25 William H. Dutton & Grant Blank, Cultures of the Internet: The Internet in Britain, 
OXFORD INTERNET SURVEY 2013 REPORT, available at http://oxis.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/43/2014/11/OxIS-2013.pdf. 
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generation users” (those who have multiple devices, some of which are 
mobile or portable), forty-one percent said it was “essential” for their 
information needs.26 As everything will become even more networked 
in the years to come, this perception will continue, even if, as some 
argue, the Internet begins to be taken for granted as a part of everyday 
life, like water or electricity—also essential.  
 The significance of the Internet has not escaped the attention of 
politicians and regulators. To many, the Internet has become simply 
too important to be ignored. They can no longer take a laissez-faire 
approach and entrust an essential infrastructure of society to others.  
2. The Decline of Traditional Media and Telecommunications 
 In parallel with the rising significance of the Internet, there has 
been a beginning of the decline, if not the end, of some of the more 
traditional media and communications technologies. It has become 
conventional wisdom that no medium is entirely replaced by new 
media. Radio has been called the “cockroach” of the communication 
sector, that is, it just keeps on going.27 Also, I, along with others, have 
long discussed the complementarity of the Internet with traditional 
media. For example, for years, many people who have said they read 
the news online have also said they continued to read a newspaper. 28 
 There are signs, however, that use of the Internet and related ICTs, 
such as mobile and mobile Internet, are beginning to undermine more 
traditional channels of communication, such as “traditional” cable and 
satellite bundles, which are expected to be replaced by Internet 
services such as Netflix. Moves to bring newsfeeds more seamlessly 
into social media are another example of where complementarity 
could morph into greater levels of substitution of online news for the 
traditional newspaper.  
26 Id. 
27 See The Cockroach of Mass Media: Why Radio Has Survived, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/bfe7b37c-fd99-401f-a72e-
bdbee1657a78. 
28 Nic Newman et al., Social Media and the News: Implications for the Press and Society, 
in SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET 135-48 (Mark Graham & William H. Dutton eds., 2014).  
166 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:1 
 Dropping the fixed-line phone—what some have called “cord 
cutting”—may provide the best example of this decline.29 This 
provides a good example, as it has been the basis for many national 
definitions of what should be a universal service. While I was in 
Britain, regulators began to see the proportion of households without 
a fixed-line phone start to decline. In the United States, as early as 
2009, The Economist featured an article entitled Unwired, which 
noted: “Despite some of the flakiest mobile-network coverage in the 
developed world, one in four households has now gone mobile only.”30  
 This decline in fixed-line services has been driven in part by price, 
as mobile phones have been a less expensive option for many 
households.31 Yet, given the support for basic services, it is not simply 
because households cannot afford it, but because younger people and 
many others have preferred to rely on their mobile cell phones.32 
Similar trends in the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, 
among other countries, are raising new questions about how to define 
universal service, with some suggesting it should be universal “access 
to broadband,” rather than universal access to any particular device.33 
Interestingly, while this might be a valuable redefinition of universal 
service, it also begins to move the Internet more clearly into a 
regulatory space, such as creating a demand for regulation of 
emergency services to be compatible over mobile as well as fixed-line 
phones. 
 It is not just the fixed-line phone. Think about the setbacks being 
faced by newspapers in many, albeit not all, countries, or current 
discussions that the future of content delivery may mean the end of 
29 Matthew Garrahan & Eric Platt, US Media Shares Hit by ‘Cord-Cutting’ Fears, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f363152c-3b90-11e5-
8613-07d16aad2152.html#axzz3wRB80Lyn. 
30 Unwired, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14213965. 
31 Fixed-Line Decline Accelerates as the Number of Mobile Voice and Data Connections 
Grow, OFCOM, http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-
data/communications-market-reports/cmr11/telecoms-networks/5.32. 
32 Id. 
33 The Quello Center’s Advisory Board raised this point in defining emerging issues 
surrounding communications policy. See William H. Dutton, Quello Policy Issues: 
Comments on Emerging Issues, THE JAMES AND MARY QUELLO CENTER (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://quello.msu.edu/quello-policy-issues-comments-on-emerging-issues/. 
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television and premium cable TV as we have come to know them.34 In 
these cases, traditional regulatory agencies, from the FCC to the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), are seeing the 
ground shift under their feet, and understandably so. It is not 
surprising that some wish not only to redefine universal service, but 
also to redefine their roles and move into areas that are providing 
functionally equivalent services along with new services.   
3. Moral Panics over the New Media: Calls to “Do Something!” 
 A third major reason why policy is becoming more significant is an 
apprehension that the Internet and related ICTs are creating or 
exacerbating serious problems. It is arguable that many such fears are 
disproportionate reactions to novel technology. In this way, fears 
about social media and the Internet are becoming the “moral panics” 
of this decade. The Internet and social media have by and large 
replaced television as the object of moral panics, such as over their 
impact on children and everyone’s lives. Today, there is hardly a 
mention of television when concerns are raised about children’s 
attention spans and reading abilities. Of course, in the 1980s, when 
parents and teachers raised concerns about the attention spans of 
children, it was television that was the culprit, and computers in 
schools were the solution, given their “holding power.”35  
 It is the case that the Internet, the web, and social media are 
viewed increasingly as contributing to a host of problems. Anyone 
attending a conference around the Internet and new media that is 
broader than the Internet research community will hear a litany of 
concerns around such issues as child protection, Internet addiction, 
social isolation, romance scams, hate speech, bullying, sexting, 
cybercrime, and terrorism, including the recruitment of terrorists and 
self-radicalization through online videos and related material on the 
Internet. There is a flow of journalistic treatments of how adept the 
Islamic State is on Twitter.36 Gone are the days when the Internet 
34 Lee W. McKnight, Over the Virtual Top: Digital Service Value Chain Disintermediation 
Implications for Hybrid Heterogeneous Network Regulation, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
NETWORK (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2495901 (from the 42nd TPRC 
Research Conference at George Mason University School of Law)  
35 SEYMOUR A. PAPERT, MINDSTORMS: CHILDREN, COMPUTERS, AND POWERFUL IDEAS 
(1980). 
36 Rick Gladstone and Vindu Goel, ISIS Is Adept on Twitter, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
5, 2015, at A12. 
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community worried mainly about such things as flaming, hate mail, 
and copyright infringement.  
 Are some of these concerns moral panics? Yes. Are they taken out 
of proportion? In many cases, I am sure. Still, politicians and public 
officials are faced with these concerns and do not know how to 
respond. They feel the need to “do something” about these problems. 
Literally, you can hear politicians telling communication regulators to: 
“Do something.” 
4. Public Trust in Regulation 
 Finally, one of the most interesting trends that emerged from our 
OxIS surveys of people in the U.K. was a growing belief that the 
Internet required “somewhat more” or “more” regulation. Despite the 
fact that only about twenty percent of respondents said they trusted 
the government; and despite that most respondents said they trusted 
the providers of Internet services more than they trusted the 
government; more and more people responded that the Internet 
should be regulated more than it has been in the past. In 2013, our 
survey of individuals in Britain found that forty-four percent of 
Internet users thought the government should regulate the Internet 
“more” or “far more.” Even worse, are the attitudes of retired 
individuals. Among those who are retired, seventy-one percent believe 
the government should regulate the Internet “more” or “far more.”37  
 However, this is not simply a generational issue. Our analysis of 
the attitudes and beliefs of Internet users found that just over one in 
ten Internet users felt the Internet was a pleasurable escape, an 
efficient tool, or a social facilitator.38 The majority of users were very 
moderate in their views on the Internet, if not somewhat 
uncomfortable online. We classified fourteen percent as “adigital,” 
meaning that they tended to see the Internet as out of their control 
and a problem-generator.39 In short, many in the public, even among 
users, are not enthusiastic about all aspects of the Internet and are, 
therefore, open to calls for regulatory intervention.  
37 Dutton & Blank, Cultures of the Internet, supra note 25, at 53. 
38 William H. Dutton & Grant Blank, Cultures on the Internet, INTERMEDIA, Winter 
2014/15, at 55-57. 
39 Id. at 57. 
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 Network neutrality might be a case in point, where much of the 
demand for FCC regulation seemed to come from the Internet 
community, rather than the industry. Approximately four million 
submissions arrived at the FCC in response to their network neutrality 
consultation.40 They were a mixed bag, ranging from informed and 
valuable to the frivolous and unhelpful, but the sheer number of 
submissions alone made the consultation more influential than many 
others in the eyes of the Commissioners. Not surprisingly, in an area 
once reigned by engineering, legal, and economic analysis, some 
worried that a new “populism” would be “undermining the public 
good.”41 Of course, the Internet is enabling more public engagement 
and participation in all areas of policy and regulation, but this is a new 
element in a technocratic policy domain. 
 This is one huge and consequential result stemming in part from 
the moral panics over the new media. An increasing proportion of the 
public believes more regulation is needed, and politicians are being 
told to do something. Moreover, as you can see in the rise of 
regulatory initiatives, politicians are, indeed, trying to do something. 
Unfortunately, there is no easy solution, or even a symbolic response, 
that might satisfy the public.  
 Remember the V-Chip? Many calls for the government to protect 
children from violent or sexually explicit content on television led to 
similar demands for regulators to do something. Then, in 1996, the 
Clinton Administration championed the Violence-Chip, or V-Chip, 
that could be installed in television sets to enable parents to block 
objectionable programming.42 Maybe this was a symbolic response, 
rather than a real solution. Notwithstanding whether parents could set 
this up or whether children could hack their V-Chip, this initiative 
went very far in addressing public anxieties and silencing public 
demand, at some level.  
40  Estimate by the FCC’s CIO, David Bray. See David Bray, The importance of Public 
Service #Change Agents in Exponential Times, VIMEO (Sept. 21, 2015), available at 
https://vimeo.com/140513826 (from Quello Center).  
41 Research underway at the Quello Center points more to a “tech populism” than to a 
grassroots movement among users. See Network Neutrality Impact Study, JAMES AND 
MARY QUELLO CENTER, http://quello.msu.edu/research/network-neutrality-impact-study/ 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2016); Robert Atkinson et al., How Tech Populism is Undermining 
Innovation, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://itif.org/publications/2015/04/01/how-tech-populism-undermining-innovation.  
42 The passage of a U.S. telecommunications reform bill in 1996 mandated that a V-Chip be
 
installed in every new television set sold in the United States by 1999. DUTTON, SOCIETY ON 
THE LINE, supra note 2, at 67.    
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 Over the last decade, I have actually followed the spirit of the V-
Chip, arguing that policy and practice should focus on moving any 
content filtering as close as possible to the household. The 
development of more intelligent home hubs, such as to support 
greater cybersecurity in the household, could also enable households 
to set content controls in truly meaningful ways. Already, many 
households with children have filters installed on their family 
computer—over forty percent in the U.K., for example.43 In the 
interim, until more sophisticated intelligence reaches the household, 
Internet intermediaries are increasingly providing content-filtering 
services.  
 Yet, even in this effort to empower households, policymakers have 
nudged Internet intermediaries to set “filters on” as the default, rather 
than something they can opt into—forcing households to request 
access to unfiltered content. So-called “default filtering” is viewed as a 
more effective means to reduce children’s access to inappropriate 
programming. Instead of opting into content filtering, households 
increasingly have to opt out.44 This is one factor that contributed to 
Britain being listed as one of the “Enemies of the Internet” by 
Reporters Without Borders in 2014, for having such a high level of 
Internet censorship and surveillance.45 Of course, content filters do 
not address many rising concerns, one being radicalization. Due to 
there being no technological fix in sight for many of these moral 
panics, governments and regulators will do something, even if they do 
not know exactly what to do yet. What are the risks? What are the 
opportunities? 
a. Risks? 
 There is no quick technical fix, or obvious symbolic response, to 
clarion calls to “do something” about the host of problems associated 
with the Internet. More importantly, and more generally, we lack 
43 Ofcom Report on Internet Safety Measures: Strategies of Parental Protection for 
Children Online, OFCOM (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/internet-safety-measures.pdf. 
44 Tim Cushing, UK’s Web Filters Blocking Nearly One-Fifth of the World’s Most Popular 
Websites, TECHDIRT (July 3, 2014), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140702/22000227768/uks-web-filters-blocking-
nearly-one-fifth-worlds-most-popular-websites.shtml. 
45 Internet Enemies, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 12, 2009), 
http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies_2009_2_.pdf.  
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good, appropriate models or frameworks for regulating the Internet. 
Ithiel de Sola Pool understood this, even before we talked about the 
Internet per se.46 In thinking about how to regulate computer-
mediated communication, he reviewed the problems and the lack of fit 
between the new media and all of the existing regulatory models for 
old media—the post, the news, telephony, broadcasting, and cable 
communication.  
 Over more than a decade, in the context set by the First 
Amendment and Computer Inquiry II in the United States, the 
Internet model was essentially not regulated—letting the providers of 
enhanced services and the Internet and, increasingly, the public and 
end users, shape innovation and the use of this new technology. In 
this context, you could, quite literally, hear regulators talking about 
what to do about television as more and more households could watch 
television on their computers and use computers on their televisions. 
Should the U.K., for example, keep existing broadcast regulations, 
such as the watershed hours, to prevent violent or explicit sex off the 
air until after 9 p.m.? (A few politicians famously asked: If there is a 
watershed on the TV, then why is there not one for the Internet?47) Or 
should they deregulate broadcasting, making it more like the 
Internet? 
 The Internet’s very success in uptake and support in the United 
States and around the world reinforced this light to no regulatory 
approach, where governmental regulation was perceived to be a 
limitation, if not a danger, threatening to put a brake on innovation 
and raise the costs of services, thereby diminishing their use and 
impact.48 The lack of innovation in telecommunications, along with its 
high costs, led to global efforts to liberalize telecommunications 
regulation beginning in the early 1980s, which contributed to this 
negative perception of the risks of regulatory interventions.  
 Nevertheless, given all the reasons outlined above, it looks like 
moving towards less broadcasting regulation is not going to be the 
major direction of travel in the coming years. So, the problem 
46 See POOL, supra note 21. 
47 Mic Wright, A ‘Watershed’ for the Internet? People this Stupid Should Not be Making 
Our Laws, TELEGRAPH, July 25, 2013, 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/micwright/100009434/a-watershed-for-the-
internet-people-this-stupid-should-not-be-making-our-laws/. 
48 Walter S. Baer, Telecommunications Infrastructure Competition: The Costs of Delay, in 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES: VISIONS AND REALITIES, 353-70 
(William H. Dutton ed., 1996). 
172 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:1 
remains: We have no truly appropriate regulatory model to impose on 
the Internet. The general problem, however, is that without a built 
purpose and appropriate model for regulating the Internet, politicians 
and regulators will fall back on old and not entirely appropriate 
models.  
 I should emphasize a point I made earlier: Regulation is not 
inherently good or bad per se. The First Amendment is regulation. 
Early non-regulation of the value-added services was an IT-led 
industrial policy in many respects. The major regulatory risk is that 
inappropriate regulation could be imposed on the most important 
innovations of our time.  
5. Multiple Regulatory Models for Multiple Layers of the Internet 
 Obviously, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler’s support for network 
neutrality regulation is a case in point—particularly in light of the 
controversy following the three to two FCC vote for network 
neutrality49 and the praise it has received from many of my colleagues. 
Is this a case of applying an old model to regulate the Internet? To 
Chairman Wheeler, and many other proponents of network neutrality, 
this regulation is sort of a Freedom of the Internet policy, but let us 
look at the details and the consequences. First, should the Internet fall 
under Title II and be subject to regulation as a common carrier? 
Although this symposium has been instructive on various aspects of 
this question, I see a possible risk of this approach that I have not 
heard discussed.   
 In the United States, there is a problem of insufficient alternatives 
and competition in access to the household. In many nations with 
more competition among last-mile broadband providers, there is less 
of a concern or perceived need for regulation to prevent a carrier from 
blocking or throttling (slowing) services. In Britain, for example, when 
the United States began discussing network neutrality in 2004,50 U.K. 
regulators had a difficult time imagining that network neutrality had 
any relevance in the British context, where most households had 
49  FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open Internet, FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-
strong-sustainable-rules-protect-open-internet. 
50  Tim Wu is credited with coining the term “network neutrality” in 2003. See Emil 
Guillermo, Father of Net Neutrality, Tim Wu, Hails FCC Decision, NBC NEWS, Feb. 26, 
2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/father-net-neutrality-tim-wu-hails-
fcc-decision-n313656. 
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choices among broadband providers.51 In the United States, however, 
there is a relative lack of competition in last-mile provision on a given 
platform, such as DSL or cable, making the case for network neutrality 
regulation stronger. The model, however, applies principally to 
carriage into the home—the last mile—and, therefore, illustrates the 
dilemma of the blind regulators and the elephant, grappling with one 
piece or one layer of the ensemble of networks and services that define 
the Internet. You can see where this step might well take regulation.  
 It is not far fetched to see every layer of the Internet leading 
politicians and regulators to bring in other models that appear 
suitable to different parts of the elephant in the room—the Internet. 
We will not only have multiple technological layers of the Internet, but 
also multiple regulatory layers imposed by multiple agencies and 
other authorities to put this J-ELLO into an assortment of old, 
outdated, and, potentially, inappropriate molds.  
 Are there other molds? Yes, indeed. This is clearly the case 
internationally, but it is arguably true as well for the United States, 
despite its First Amendment traditions.  
 In many nations, Internet intermediaries are increasingly being 
treated as if they were a newspaper. They are not only starting to edit 
content, but are being told to edit content, such as Google being 
instructed by the EU and German courts about the right to be 
forgotten.63 While newspapers in the United States are not subject to 
content restrictions, they are subject to libel and claims over the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. If ISPs begin taking 
on an editing role and become regulated as if they were a newspaper, 
this could have a chilling effect on their activities.  
 At other times, intermediaries are being regulated as if they were 
broadcasters and are instructed to be selective in the content they 
offer, such as blocking certain material. Rules established for 
broadcasters are also being applied to bloggers. For example, people 
have been arrested in Britain and elsewhere for inappropriate, ill-
judged tweets, though, arguably, not tweets that merit being sent to 
jail.53 In Britain, this is largely due to the application of regulation 
51  Broadband Competition Reaches New Milestone, OFCOM (Feb. 7, 2012),  
http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/news/broadband-competition-reaches-new-milestone-2/. 
52 Europe: 1, Google: 0: EU Court Ruling a Victory for Privacy, SPIEGEL ONLINE, May 20, 
2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/court-imposes-right-to-be-forgotten-
on-google-search-results-a-970419.html. 
53 See, e.g., Bianca Bosker, Arrested Over Twitter: 8 Tweets That Got People BUSTED, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2010, 10:19 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/25/arrested-over-twitter-8-t_n_693866.html. 
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designed for broadcasting—electronic communication—to social 
media, such as Section 127 of the U.K.’s Communications Act.54 As a 
consequence, a detailed set of guidelines was developed to consider in 
prosecuting cases brought to law enforcement around the use of social 
media.55 With or without guidelines, this is, arguably, likely to have a 
chilling effect on the use of social media, as users will self-regulate to 
avoid problems with law enforcement and the courts.  
 Even more unbelievable is the case of a Turkish journalist jailed 
for “liking” a comment on a Facebook post that insulted the nation’s 
president.56 Journalists are being subjected to policy that was 
designed for broadcasting to millions, not for blogging 140 characters 
to your “followers” or “liking” a comment.  
 This is particularly troubling because politicians with a weak 
understanding of the Internet are driving many of the initiatives. Too 
many politicians behind such initiatives do not have experience with 
using social media or, for that matter, even e-mail. The Internet is an 
“experience technology,” and it is difficult to understand the Internet 
without such experience.57  
 I was recently at a UNESCO conference in which speaker after 
speaker noted that anything considered illegal offline should be illegal 
online, that is, laws that apply offline should apply online. I noted to 
that audience, and again today, that this idea that the Internet is the 
Wild West, without laws and without sheriffs, is misleading. Fraud is 
illegal online, and so on—things that are illegal offline are, indeed, 
illegal online.  
 One of the problems that lay behind the Wild West image of the 
Internet is not a lack of law or regulation, but the perception that it is 
unregulated and the difficulty of enforcement on a new technology 
that travels across jurisdictions and does so very, very fast. Just as the 
interstate bank robbers, Bonnie and Clyde, helped create the U.S. 
54 Lilian Edwards, Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003: Threat or Menace?, SCL 
JOURNAL, Sept. 10, 2012, http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed28102.  
55 Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving Communications Sent Via Social Media, THE 
CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/ (last 
visited July 12, 2015). 
56 Journalist Receives Jail Sentence for ‘Liking Erdoğan Insult’, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS 
(Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/journalist-receives-jail-sentence-for-
liking-erdogan-insult.aspx?pageID=238&nID=80587&NewsCatID=339. 
57 William H. Dutton, Trust in the Internet as an Experience Technology, 9 INFORMATION, 
COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY 433 (2006). 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internet is likely to create 
new law enforcement mechanisms to overcome the issues of 
international coordination and cooperation at unbelievably fast 
speeds. Still, that is a law enforcement issue, not an issue of a lack of 
law or policy per se.  
 That said, the Wild West image is certainly fueling a range of 
regulatory initiatives, many of which are, arguably, inappropriate, and 
together which might well undermine the vitality of the Internet. 
Regulation designed for the press, because it is an edited source, is not 
necessarily right for a blogger. Something perfectly reasonable for a 
broadcaster, given the pervasiveness of broadcasting, is not 
necessarily appropriate for a Twitter user. If we want to call the 
Internet a common carrier, for example, then it might well be 
inappropriate to regulate content—but nations are increasingly doing 
so. 
 Is there a case for American exceptionalism in this area, given the 
centrality of the First Amendment? While it is true that there are few, 
if any, examples of Twitter arrests to-date in the United States,58 the 
use of multiple regulatory models remains a significant issue in the 
American context. Going back to Ithiel de Sola’s focus on this issue, it 
is clear that he saw this as an American problem, despite the First 
Amendment. His seminal book, Technologies of Freedom, devotes a 
chapter to each medium of communication commercialized before 
1950—that is, print, common carriage, and broadcast—and also cable. 
Each of these chapters highlights the variation in the regulatory 
traditions shaping expression within each medium, despite the central 
role of the First Amendment in providing the foundational legal 
context for all of them. All the old electronic media developed 
different regulatory traditions under the First Amendment, each 
tradition exerting different levels of governmental and regulatory 
control over expression. As Pool puts it: 
The problem is worldwide. What is true for the United 
States is true, mutatis mutandis, for all free nations. All 
have the same three systems. All are in their way 
deferential to private publishing but allow government 
control or ownership of carriers and broadcasters. And 
all are moving into the era of electronic 
communication. So they face the same prospect of 
either freeing up their electronic media or else finding 
58 See Bosker, supra note 52. 
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their major means of communication slipping back 
under political control.59  
 The regulatory model that is chosen for the Internet will shape the 
application of the First Amendment in the United States and the level 
of political control worldwide. Applying different models to multiple 
layers and uses of the Internet and related social media is likely to 
exacerbate the difficulties of protecting expression. While the 
American debate over network neutrality raised the prospect of 
greater regulatory control over expression online,60 the cut and thrust 
of efforts to support or oppose this initiative should not be 
disregarded. The application of different regulatory models all carry 
with them potential implications for governmental control of the 
electronic media, directly and indirectly, such as in the potential for 
ushering in more state, as well as federal, regulation of the last-mile of 
the Internet in the United States.61 Finally, global appropriation of 
regulatory models will increasingly impinge on the United States, such 
as in the case of European courts and information commissioners 
pushing for international rights to be forgotten. 
b. Opportunities? 
 The factors giving rise to an increase in policy and regulatory 
attention on the Internet could also present opportunities to address 
the problems.  
II. INTEREST IN INTERNET POLICY AND REGULATION 
 To begin with, this concern is creating a genuine renewal of 
interest in ideas concerning the appropriate set of policies and 
regulations for governing the Internet at all levels, from local and 
national arenas to the global. The period in which there was nominally 
“non-regulation” of the Internet had the effect of marginalizing, if not 
silencing, discussion of Internet regulatory models.  
59 See POOL, supra note 21, at 8. 
60 Ajit Pai & Lee Goodman, Internet Freedom Works, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Feb. 23, 
2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/fcc-internet-regulations-ajit-
pai-115399#.Vdi6tumsd40. 
61 Jonathan J. Nadler, The FCC’s Bright Lines, INTERMEDIA, June 2015, at 20-24. 
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A. New and Appropriate Regulatory Models and Policy 
 Many participants in the policy process recognize the degree to 
which inappropriate models are being applied to the Internet. Many 
regulatory officials and experts realize, for example, that treating 
Internet intermediaries as if they are traditional broadcasters is 
problematic, at best. Nevertheless, they are in a position in which they 
must follow the decision of policymakers forced to “do something.” 
They are a natural and receptive audience for more appropriate 
models of Internet regulation, creating a welcomed setting for the 
academic community, civil society, and others to propose new and 
more appropriate regulatory models.  
 A parallel interest is developing a more rational and holistic 
approach to the Internet, such as through the rewrite or drafting of 
new communications law and policy. Britain may consider revision of 
the Communications Act of 2003, just as the United States may revisit 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which, itself, was a major 
revision of the Communications Act of 1934. Ideally, it will not take 
another sixty years to revisit the Telecommunications Act, even 
though many believe such a revision is optimistic if not idealistic 
during a time of major partisan divides.  
B. Refocus on Key Issues 
 There is also the opportunity for the debates surrounding privacy, 
network neutrality, and related regulatory initiatives to generate more 
informed perspectives, which could potentially refocus attention on 
key issues not presently at the center of attention. A key example 
includes concern over the loss of anonymity in the digital world, a 
right that some nations have placed a high priority on, such as the 
United States through the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision in 
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., involving 
the circulation of petitions.62 The Supreme Court has also extended 
the right to anonymity as a protection of First Amendment freedoms 
of speech on the Internet in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.63 
Despite these rulings in the United States and globally, there is a 
growing realization that anonymity is becoming more difficult, if not 
impossible, to guarantee online.  
62 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
63 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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  Competition is another key issue that seems to have been 
challenged by the new Internet context. Questions have been posed 
about how to judge the national concentration of ownership and 
media competition on a global Internet. Old indicators of media 
concentration are no longer sufficient. Due to network neutrality 
being, in part, a protection against limited competition, it may be 
better to deal directly with competition, rather than deal indirectly 
with it through rulings on neutrality.  
III. CHALLENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH: WHAT SHOULD BE 
DONE? BY WHOM?  
 The good news for policy researchers is that these issues should 
put policy research in the center of Internet developments over the 
coming years, if not decades. There are barriers, however, to 
researchers providing leadership in addressing Internet policy and 
governance. 
 It could be that the rise of policy and regulation will restore the 
vitality of several disciplines within the study of media, 
communication, and the Internet.75 There could well be a competitive 
advantage for some fields, such as engineering, law, and economics, 
because their frameworks provide normative guidelines. Economists 
can point to an optimal policy. Legal scholars can address the case law 
behind recommendations for and against particular prescriptions. 
Engineers can point to techno-economic imperatives that dictate an 
optimal solution.  
 Yet, the dynamic of issues surrounding the Internet, such as the 
moral panics described above, will tend to limit the significance of any 
single academic discipline and foster more interdisciplinary research 
than in the earlier era of telecommunications policy research. 
Interdisciplinary research entails less of a focus on law and policy as 
an end in itself and more of a focus on problem solving, such as how to 
ensure quality news, network neutrality, or privacy of sensitive 
personal information. A problem focus immediately drives research in 
more multi- and inter-disciplinary directions.   
 Early telecommunications policy was dominated by a technocracy 
of sorts, a virtual invisible college of economists, lawyers, and 
engineers, including some represented in this symposium. Still, even 
this interdisciplinary mix is too limited for the problems confronting 
64 My colleague, Johannes Bauer, developed this point in a Quello Center workshop on 
policy at Michigan State University on December 4, 2014. 
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the Internet over security, freedom of expression, and privacy that are 
clearly engaging far more stakeholders and disciplinary perspectives 
across the social and physical sciences.  
 Nevertheless, computer scientists and engineers have remained 
dominant in discussions of the Internet arena, while social scientists 
and policy researchers, at least since the 1970s, have been sidelined; 
they have been on the margins of debate over the Internet, and this is 
true even in debates surrounding its societal implications. Social and 
policy researchers were often key to important debates about 
telecommunications, broadcasting, and cable, and will remain so, but 
they have been largely out of the room on key issues over the Internet 
and related digital ICTs. It is true that computer scientists and 
engineers need to be called to advise on policy remedies, but they need 
to be complemented by those in other disciplines, including 
researchers who can speak about social issues, such as moral panics.  
 Further, even when telecommunications policy research was 
strong in departments of communications and media, it was often 
separated as an adjunct or specialized field. Clearly, there is hardly a 
field of media, information, or Internet research today that does not 
have major implications and relevance for policy and regulation. 
Therefore, we need to make the study of policy and regulation more 
mainstream within academic departments and colleges—and not 
continue to treat this topic as a marginal specialization.  
 One consequence of these first two points is that academics 
focusing on communications policy research have a difficult time 
shaping their departments and respective journals. As universities 
across the world jump on the bandwagon of high-impact journals, it is 
ironic that many journals centered in the policy and regulatory field 
are not high on the media, information, and Internet lists of such 
journals because they are based on citations and other factors that are 
steps removed from any real impact on policy or practice. This 
competition for journal recognition has continued to undermine 
interdisciplinary policy research.   
 Moreover, the conflicts in communications policy and regulation 
run deep across industry and across partisan political divides. In the 
United States, industry divides are often deeper and more severe than 
partisan divides. Since the 1970s, and post-deregulation in the United 
States, few industries could stand up to the force of the Internet’s 
diffusion and application across all sectors. The division between 
cable and telecommunications seemed to recede somewhat, but, 
increasingly, the division between the telecommunications and cable 
companies versus the Internet industry seems to have been lit up by 
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network neutrality—and the division is likely to grow as they are 
perceived to affect the very survival of key industries, such as cable.65 
Moreover, these industry splits have begun to align with partisan 
divisions, with network neutrality rules under Title II being viewed as 
an initiative of the Democratic Party versus the Republican Party, with 
a three to two vote in the FCC, as well as a Democratic Obama 
Administration versus a Republican Congress.66  
 This was not the case with cable television in the United States, 
when cable was a bipartisan initiative.67 In contrast, cable did create 
partisan divides in many European countries, such as in France and 
(West) Germany, where cable system development was often stalled 
as a consequence.68  
 Likewise, the push for the Internet did not cut along partisan lines, 
as it was viewed as a market and industry-led industrial policy that 
was not problematic for years. The Internet was viewed initially as 
simply an interesting innovation before it became viewed over time as 
an increasingly essential infrastructure, with huge social and 
economic dividends. As the case suggests, however, as the Internet is 
perceived as more significant to society, politicians and regulators 
have become more engaged in Internet policy and regulatory issues, 
such as network neutrality, moving the Internet into a more 
politicized debate that is likely to extend into the coming years.  
 Moreover, academics are taking on interested roles, if not leading 
competing sides, as advocates in the debate over such issues as 
network neutrality, all the while opposing many other regulatory 
initiatives, such as mass surveillance or the criminalization of file 
sharing as a tool of copyright protection. As many advocates of 
network neutrality see themselves defending some version of the First 
65 Debate over the implications of the network neutrality ruling for investment in cable and 
broadband infrastructure, generally, has presented dramatically different views. See, e.g., 
Trefis Team, FCC Ruling on Net Neutrality Will Have Major Implications for the Internet 
Space, FORBES, Feb. 26, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/02/26/fcc-ruling-on-net-neutrality-
will-have-major-implications-for-the-internet-space/. 
66 Earlier efforts to support network neutrality rules by the G.O.P. FCC chairs sought to do 
so while freeing DSL from basic telecommunications regulation, to be on par with market 
regulation of cable modems. These rules, which did not rely on Title II authority, were 
rebuffed by the D.C. Circuit Court.  
67 William H. Dutton et al., A Comparative Analysis, in WIRED CITIES: SHAPING THE 
FUTURE OF COMMUNICATIONS 456-86 (William H. Dutton et al. eds., 1986). 
68 Id.
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Amendment for the Internet, this is understandable, but as academics 
move into the role of policy advocates they are less credible and 
trusted as disinterested policy researchers. 
 I should say that I often am an advocate for various policies. I have 
served on regulatory advisory committees and, in such roles, have 
taken positions on issues facing these committees. I have spoken on 
platforms for and against positions. For example, I have spoken out 
against identity cards in the U.K., before opposition became popular. 
It is possible and useful, however, to separate one’s advocacy role 
from policy research. Academics in the policy and regulatory space 
need to be able to wear more than one hat.  
 In sum, I see policy researchers in the coming years facing four 
critical challenges: 
1. A Voice for Analytic Skepticism.  The first, and a
continuing challenge, is being trusted as a source of
what Steve Woolgar has termed “analytic skepticism.”69
It is the role of academics to open others’ minds by
challenging taken-for-granted assumptions. It is not
their role to parrot the advocates of popular policy
positions.
2. Challenging Conventional Models and Creating New
Models.  Second, and following from this position, we
need to be the ones who challenge conventional models
of regulation and their applicability to the Internet.
Most importantly, we need to develop new models that
will respond to concerns over what should be done to
address the issues driving heavier reliance on Internet
policy and regulation.
3. Sources of Analytical Frameworks and Empirical
Evidence. Third, we can do what many others cannot
by bringing analytical frameworks, such as economic
models and systematic empirical research, to bear on
issues of policy and practice.
4. Building the Strength of the Policy Research
Community. The symposium conveys some sense of
the strength and potential of the research community
69 DUTTON, SOCIETY ON THE LINE, supra note 2, at 335-37. 
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in media, information, and Internet policy. Yet, I would 
guess that if we look historically, the policy research 
community has been diminished over the last several 
decades.  
 Consider the 1980s as a start. The AT&T divestiture settlement, as 
announced in 1982, fostered endless discussion and meetings in the 
United States and abroad on the meaning of “deregulation,” as many 
Europeans were confused by the degree that the settlement was 
actually ushering in more regulated competition.70 I recall attending a 
conference in France where everyone was perplexed by the concept of 
deregulation because it seemed to fly in the face of what was being 
done with AT&T. I, along with others, had to explain that they should 
not take the term “deregulation” too seriously because it was 
politically, more than analytically, framed. Be that as it may, it 
spawned research, publications, and interest in telecommunications 
policy.  
 Innovation in two-way cable communication systems in the late 
1970s and early 1980s was another development that fostered interest 
in communications policy. Ralph Lee Smith wrote about the Wired 
Nation, along with James Martin and others.71 This led to global 
discussion about national cable policies and work on comparative 
communications policy.  
 Also in the early 1980s, for example, Ambassador Walter 
Annenberg provided support for the Annenberg Washington Program 
in Communications Policy Studies.72 The program later folded and 
was put in the hands of Newton Minow at Northwestern University, 
leading to the publication of a few volumes of policy studies from 1989 
to 1995, but closing in 1997.73 It was then transformed to The 
Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, 
which shifted away from communications policy to focus more on 
political campaigns and elections.74  
70 PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM (1987).  
71 Dutton et al., supra note 66. 
72 About the Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies, 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, https://wayback.archive-
it.org/6321/20140428150227/http://www.annenberg.northwestern.edu/.   
73 Id. 
74 About, ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
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 A wide range of policy centers sprung up at universities across the 
United States in the 1980s and 1990s, prior to the phenomenal rise of 
the Internet, but they have lost their role or status since. The policy 
research field needs to build other various centers for interdisciplinary 
research on media, information, and Internet policy and research. In 
the short term, however, we need to collaborate more and network on 
key issues. This is the Internet age, and key new areas are far more 
strongly networked than is our field. One clear example is the field of 
Internet studies, which has developed a Network of Internet Research 
Centers that is growing rapidly and overlaps with many other issues 
facing the policy community.75  
 Susan Crawford posted a useful blog on the battle for the future of 
the Internet, in which she argued that the new metaphor of the 
Internet being the “new TV” was way too limited and that we not only 
need better metaphors to guide policy and practice, but also what she 
called “serious work” on “the Internet policy gap-filling front.”76 This 
is an observation echoed by other authorities in the field, including 
Elliot Maxwell.77 My sense is that these critics see real challenges 
facing the future of Internet policy research, similar to those I have 
sketched here and they recognize that the success of this research will 
be critical to the vitality of the Internet in the coming years and 
decades.  
POINTS OF SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 In conclusion, it seems clear that the next decade will see policy 
and regulatory initiatives eclipse technological innovations as the key 
narrative describing the forces shaping the future of the Internet. 
Multi- and inter- disciplinary policy researchers need to step up to 
address the issues driving often inappropriate policy and regulation, 
by bringing key academic values and skills to bear in the area.  
75 See, e.g., NETWORK OF CENTERS, http://networkofcenters.net/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
76 Susan Crawford, The Future of the Internet Might Hinge on This Bet, BACKCHANNEL, 
https://medium.com/backchannel/the-future-of-the-internet-might-hinge-on-this-bet-
cb6d328600c#.fe5fodfnk. 
77 Elliot Maxwell, chairman of e-Maxwell and Associates, argued in a piece by Samantha 
Madison that the Internet policy area needs better data because he has seen what he calls 
the “crapification of data, the self-interest of parties and crippling of independent analytic 
capabilities have in fact harmed our ability to make good policy.” Samantha Madison, 
Defining Tech Populism: Tech Policy Debates Being Shaped by Angry, Populist Uprisings, 
ITIF Says, 35 COMMC’NS DAILY 63, 2 (April 2015). 
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 Let me simply illustrate these points and note that I follow my own 
advice. The Quello Center has launched a study of the impacts of 
network neutrality.78 Our research is designed to be analytically 
skeptical about all positions in debates over network neutrality 
regulation. It aims to challenge conventional wisdom on the 
implications of policy and regulation, and bring new facts and 
systematic empirical research to the debate. Ideally, this and similar 
studies will help bring policy research into the center of debate over 
the future of the Internet. That will help put policy in its rightful place.  
 
 
 
 
 
78 See Network Neutrality Impact Study, JAMES AND MARY QUELLO CENTER, 
http://quello.msu.edu/research/network-neutrality-impact-study/ (last visited Jan. 6, 
2016). 
